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Abstract
We propose a class of social evaluation functions and of inequality indices which
merge the useful features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and of S-Gini (Donaldson
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November, 19981 Introduction
We propose a class of social evaluation functions and of inequality indices which merge
the featuresofthe two mostpopularindices ofinequality. Oursocialevaluationfunctions,
denotedby
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, are indeeda combinationof the family ofAtkinson (1970)indices, char-
acterised by a normative parameter
￿ of relative inequality aversion, and of the family of
S-Gini (or Single-parameter Gini) indices of Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and
Yitzhaki (1983) (also see Kakwani (1980)), characterised by an analogous normative pa-
rameter
￿ of aversion to rank inequality. The ethical criteria of our social evaluation
functions correspondingly rely on the use of decreasing (individual or social marginal)
utilities of incomes to capture the dispersion of incomes around their mean value, and on
the use of rank-dependent ethical weights to capture the dispersion of ranks in the popu-
lation.
We introduce these social evaluation function and their associated inequality indices
in the next section, where they can be alternatively expressed in a discrete or in a con-
tinuous framework. We then justify the formulation and review the nature of the axioms
which characterise S-Gini indices. Proposition 1 subsequently shows that for social eval-
uation functions to fulﬁll these axioms and to be homothetic in incomes, they must take
the form of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Section 3 shows how our social evaluation functions can be interpreted
as average utility corrected for relative deprivation in individual welfare. The paper ends
by linking the evaluation functions to averages of altruistic welfare in the population.
2 A class of social evaluation functions
For the discrete setting, we suppose that there are
￿ individuals in the population, with
(positive) incomes denoted by
￿
￿
￿ and ordered such that
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continuous setting, we denote by
￿
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￿
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￿
￿ the p-quantile of the distribution of income (
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￿ . These formulations replace incomes in the S-Gini for-
mulation of Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983) by functions of
incomes. As Sen (1973, p.39) argues,
7
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￿
￿
￿
L
￿ can be an individual utility function, or it
can be the “component of social welfare corresponding to person
M , being itself a strictly
concave function of individual utilities”. He also adds that “it is fairly restrictive to think
of social welfare as a sum of individual welfare components” (p.39), and that one might
feel that “the social value of the welfare of individuals should depend crucially on the lev-
els of welfare (or incomes) of others” (p.41). As we will see clearly later, the formulation
of equations (1) and (2) does this by applying rank-dependent weights on each individual
welfare component
7
￿
%
￿
￿
￿
L
￿ . Moreover, as Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994, p.445) note, “the
most salient drawback of linear measures [e.g., S-Gini’s] is that the effect on the social
welfare of a transfer of income from one individual to another depends only on the rank-
ing of the incomes but not on their absolute levels”. Equations (1) and (2) also escape this
drawback since
7
￿
%
￿
N
￿ does not have to be afﬁne in incomes.
The above equations are also linked to rank-dependent expected utility theory, as
noted in Chew and Epstein (1989) and Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994). S-Ginis are mem-
bers of Single-Series Ginis (Donaldson and Weymark (1980)), which are themselves
members of Generalised Gini indices (Mehran (1976) and Weymark (1981)). These
classes of indices share interesting properties. Mehran (1976) shows that members of
the class of Generalised Ginis can be easily graphically interpreted as weighted areas
between Lorenz curves and lines of perfect equality. Weymark (1981) shows that the (ab-
solute version of the) family of generalised Gini indices is the only one which obeys an
axiom of weak independence of income source (“when the distribution of income from
all but one source of income is the same in two distributions, overall inequality is deter-
mined by the inequality of the last source”). Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) and Weymark
(1995) also show that the class of generalised Gini indices is the only one which obeys an
axiom of order-preserving-transfer. This axiom requires for our purposes that a common
transfer of individual welfare
7
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￿
&
￿ made simultaneously in two distributions between
pairs of individuals who occupy adjacent ranks in the income distributions should pre-
serve the pre- and post-transfer social evaluation ranking of the distributions. Blackorby
et al. (1994) show that the members of the family of Generalised Gini indices provide a
family of solutions to cooperative bargaining – solutions which respond by the same con-
stant to a constant addition to one agent’s component in the feasible set of utility vectors.
For the subclass of Single-Series Ginis, the weights on the individual
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L
￿ arranged in
decreasing order are independent of population size (see Theorems 1 and 2 of Donaldson
and Weymark (1980)). Bossert (1990) shows that this property is needed if an axiom of
separability of the welfare of the rich from the rest of the population is to be respected.
Finally, S-Ginis, besides obeying all previously described axioms, are the only family of
Single-Series Ginis to satisfy the Dalton Population Principle.
Yitzhaki (1983, p.264) also shows how each of the two families incorporated in equa-
3tions (1) and (2), the Atkinson and the S-Gini indices, have a common dual graphical
interpretation as a weigthed distance of the cumulative distribution function curve from
the ordinate (for the Atkinson indices) and from the abscissa (for the S-Ginis). We gener-
alise this interpretation below.
For a social evaluation function to yield a relative inequality index, it must be homo-
thetic (Blackorby and Donaldson (1978)). This in turn implies a restriction on the form
of our social evaluation functions
￿
￿
, as shown by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: For a social evaluation function to satisfy all of the above mentioned
characterising S-Ginis, and for them to be homothetic, they must take the form of 1:
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Proof: The proof is immediate from Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and from a
well-known result of Pratt (1964).
As is conventional in the literature, we then deﬁne
e
￿
￿
￿
￿
as an equally distributed equiv-
alent (EDE) income (a money-metric measure of social welfare):
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We can draw on well-known results to state that
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The corresponding class of inequality indices is then:
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1An analogous reformulation holds for the continuous case.
4where
n
W stands for the mean income of
￿ . As can be easily checked, these indices are
homogeneous of degree 0 in incomes, since their underlying social evaluation functions
were devised to be homothetic. The indices for
￿
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o
p
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￿
J
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q
k also satisfy strictly the
Dalton principles of transfers and population, by which a transfer of $1 from a rich to a
poor will decrease inequality, and by which the addition of a replica of each individual in
the population will not affect the inequality indices. The indices also lie between 0 and 1.
Integration by parts of equation (2) yields an alternative way of computing the social
evaluation functions, their EDE income, and the associated indices of inequality:
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{ is the well-known generalised Lorenz curve (see
Shorrocks (1983)) of utilities. It can also be shown that a convenient way to compute
the indices is through a simple covariance formula:
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3 Relative deprivation
Let
￿
|
￿
￿
￿
[
￿
I
<
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ represent the relative welfare deprivation of an individual at rank
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distribution of income, when comparing himself with an individual at rank
￿
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distribution:
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Aggregatingthisrelative deprivation overallindividuals
￿ , we ﬁndthe following expected
relative deprivation
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If we were then to take an average of
E
5
￿
￿
￿
[
￿
￿
￿ across all individuals
M , and were to weight
each such expected deprivation by the ethical weight
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The following proposition can then be shown:
Proposition 2: A social evaluation function
￿
￿
￿
is average utility corrected by the
average relative deprivation in utility in the population:
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5Proof: The proof is straightforward from Proposition 1 in Duclos (1998) (which deals
with relative income deprivation in the context of standard S-Ginis).
4 Altruism
We can also interpret our social evaluation functions as average feelings of altruism
in the population. Let an individual at rank
￿ randomly compare himself with
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other individuals in the population. Denote the incomes of these random individuals by
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￿ equal his egoistic utility function (
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same egoistic utility function and the minimum of the utilities of the
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randomly observes. In other words, an individual’s altruistic welfare is a function of the
welfare of the least well-off person he randomly comes across in the society. Denoting
the altruistic individual welfare function as
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￿ , it then equals:
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We then have:
Proposition 3: The social welfare function
￿
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￿
is the average of altruistic welfare in
the population:
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Proof: For the proof, note ﬁrst that by deﬁnition of the altruistic individual welfare func-
tion, we have that:
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Equation (18) says that
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￿
￿ is a weighted average of his egoistic utility function and of
the utility of those that are poorer than him. The weight
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Integrating by parts the last term of (19):
6@
￿
A
￿
7
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
E
￿
￿
!
￿
r
￿
7
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¡
￿
A
/
¢
@
￿
A
￿
h
￿
%
￿
￿
/
Q
.
*
￿
s
￿
I
.
￿
/
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
K
￿
7
￿
%
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
D
￿
F
E
￿
￿ (20)
!
@
￿
A
￿
%
￿
J
/
3
.
*
￿
s
￿
I
.
t
/
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
£
￿
￿
K
￿
]
⁄
7
￿
%
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
D
￿
F
E
￿
￿ (21)
Hence, we ﬁnd the result of Proposition 3:
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Figure 1 ﬁnally shows that our social evaluation functions
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have a nice graphical
interpretation. Population ranks
￿ are shown on the horizontal axis, and the utility quan-
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the inverse distribution function of utilities
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